Taxation -- Net Gift Transfer of Appreciated Real Property Held Not To Give Rise to Taxable Gain for the Donor by Brown, William L.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 57 | Number 3 Article 9
3-1-1979
Taxation -- Net Gift Transfer of Appreciated Real
Property Held Not To Give Rise to Taxable Gain
for the Donor
William L. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William L. Brown, Taxation -- Net Gift Transfer of Appreciated Real Property Held Not To Give Rise to Taxable Gain for the Donor, 57 N.C.
L. Rev. 476 (1979).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol57/iss3/9
NORTH CAROLINA LAW.REVIEW [Vol. 57
Taxation-Net Gift Transfer of Appreciated Real Property
Held Not To Give Rise to Taxable Gain for the Donor
Section 2502(d) of the Internal Revenue Code places the primary
liability for payment of gift taxes on the donor.' Frequently, however,
donors do not have sufficient liquid assets at the time of the contem-
plated gift to pay the resulting gift taxes, or do not want to disturb their
personal liquidity positions. To solve this problem they may make the
gift conditional on the donee's agreement to pay the gift taxes, or stipu-
late that the gift taxes be paid out of the gift property. The Internal
Revenue Service has recognized the validity of these arrangements for
gift tax purposes and has sanctioned the use of a "net gift" gift tax
computation method in such cases, which reduces the amount of the
taxable gift by the amount of gift taxes the donee is obligated to pay.2
1. I.R.C. § 2502(d) reads as follows: "The tax imposed by section 2501 [the gift tax] shall be
paid by the donor." I.R.C. § 6324(b) provides that if the donor does not make timely payment of
the gift tax the tax will become a lien on the gift made and the primary liability for the payment of
the gift tax will shift to the donee.
2. The net gift method of valuation of property for gift tax purposes is spelled out in Rev.
Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310, that superseded the original ruling in Rev. Rul. 71-232, 197 1-1 C.B.
275. These provide that the gift tax paid by the donee may be deducted from the value of the
transferred property if it can be shown that the payment of the gift tax by the donee is an express
or implied condition of the transfer. The amount of the tax is computed using this net value of the
gift property. The final tax result depends on two variables: the taxable value of the gift (which
depends on the amount of tax paid) and the amount of tax paid (which in turn depends on the
taxable value of the gift). The ruling provides the following algebraic formula to reach a solution
for the amount that will be netted from the value of the gift to produce the net gift that is taxed:
Tentative Tax .= True Tax CT)
I + Rate of Tax
The "Tentative Tax" is the tax computed on the amount of the taxable gift. The "Rate of Tax" is
the rate at which the amount of the taxable gift that exceeds the tax bracket amount is taxed. The
"True Tax" is the amount to be deducted from the value of the transferred property.
These rulings are the result of the two earlier Tax Court decisions of Lingo v. Commissioner,
23 T.C.M. (P-H) T 54,145 (1954), and Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), in which
gifts were made in inter vivos trusts and the trustees were obligated to make the gift tax payments.
The Tax Court held that the present value of the gifts could be reduced by the present worth of the
future tax payments, reasoning that the donor did not intend the amount of property necessary for
the gift tax liability to be a gift, and thus, it was not effective as property passing from the donor.
The net gift transfer is not used as a method of reducing gift tax liability. It does allow the
donor to shift his burden of taxation but does not reduce the ultimate amount of the gift tax. Gift
tax savings of the net gift vis-k-vis a conventional gift are illusory because the net gift is premised
on the assumption that the donor would have had to sell part of the contemplated gift property to
be able to pay the gift taxes on the smaller than originally planned conventional gift that would
follow the sale. So in either case the gift tax would be computed on a smaller gift.
The true benefit of the net gift is that the donor does not have to sell part of the property to
pay the gift taxes. This results in a reduction of the donor's capital gains tax burden. This avoid-
ance of recognition of capital gain is one reason the income tax consequences of the net gift have
long been disputed. Lingo, Harrison and Rev. Rul. 75-72 do not provide any direct answer to this
income tax issue because they do not address the question.
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While income is generally not recognized on the making of out-
right, unconditional gifts, the question has arisen whether a net gift
transfer alters this result.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held in Turner v. Commissioner4 that it does not. A later
Sixth Circuit decision, Johnson v. Commissioner,5 cast uncertainty on
the vitality of Turner by holding that a donor realized taxable gain in a
transfer slightly different in form from the Turner net gift.' Recently
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Hirst v. Commissioner,7 held that the net gift transfer of appreciated
real property to family members does not result in any taxable gain to
the donor.8
Taxpayer in Hirst9 owned an undivided one-half interest in three
tracts of highly appreciated, unimproved land.' 0 In an effort to relieve
herself of a heavy estate tax burden and out of a desire to benefit the
natural objects of her bounty, she decided to make a gift" of the tracts
3. The agreement to pay the gift taxes provides several bases on which to argue for income
taxation of the donor. As provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (1957), the gift could be character-
ized as part sale, part gift: a sale to the extent the gift tax exceeds the donor's adjusted basis in the
property; and a gift to the extent the value of the property is greater than the gift tax. Alterna-
tively, payment of the gift tax could confer benefits on the donor that fall within the broad defini-
tion of income found in I.R.C. § 61, especially income from discharge of indebtedness. The donee
is made primarily liable for payment of the gift taxes by agreement and thus the donor is dis-
charged from his former obligation to pay the taxes. The donor is also arguably "shedding" a
debt by having the donee in essence assume the tax encumbrance placed on the gift property by
the donor.
Despite these bases of recovery, it is easy to see why courts are hesitant even to think about
the income tax consequences of a net gift. First, they usually occur in a family context and the
donative intent of the donor is obvious (although the question of the extent of this intent is not
usually raised). Second, the economic benefits to the donor are not as apparent as cash in hand.
4. 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), a f'gper curiam 49 T.C. 356 (1968).
5. 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), af'g on other grounds 59 T.C. 791 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Duhl & Cohen, The Net Wt Technique: A Current Analysis of the Requirements
for Its Successful Use, 42 J. TAX. 158 (1975); Malstrom, A Shadow Over "Net Gifts," 64 ILL. B.J.
50 (1975); Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts: The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA.
L. REv. 935 (1976); Note, Bad Newsfor Net Givers: Donee Payment of Gift Taxes Results in Taxa-
ble Income to Donor, 36 U. PiTT. L. REv. 517 (1974).
7. 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
8. Id at 428.
9. Taxpayer was an 81 year old widow whose married son, one of the donees, was her only
living child. Id at 434-35.
10. Id at 435. Taxpayer's adjusted basis and the appraised value of each tract was found to
be as follows:
Donor's Adjusted Basis Value
Tract 1 $4,654 $291,832.50
Tract 2 3,723 119,404.50
Tract 3 -0- 33,351.50
11. Id Taxpayer transferred her interest in one tract to her son and his wife outright, and her
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
to her family. Realizing that she could not pay the resulting gift taxes
because of her lack of liquid assets,' 2 she had her son agree orally
before the transfers that he would pay all the assessable gift taxes on all
the transfers.' 3 A gift tax return that computed the taxes due by the net
gift method was filed, 4 and the son and his wife actually paid all the
gift taxes.' 5 The Commissioner asserted a deficiency in taxpayer's in-
come tax return, claiming she recognized taxable gain to the extent the
gift taxes paid exceeded her adjusted basis in the property.' 6 The Tax
Court found for the taxpayer.' 7 The court of appeals reversed this de-
cision, but on rehearing en banc, a majority of the court affirmed the
Tax Court decision.'" The majority reasoned that taxpayer intended
no sale and received no economic benefit or gain.' 9 Johnson was dis-
tinguished on its facts and the decision rested solely on the authority of
Turner, which the majority considered dispositive of the question.20 A
strong dissent argued that Turner was no longer good authority and
found that in substance taxpayer exchanged a portion of the gift prop-
erty for the amount of gift taxes paid.'
The authority primarily relied on by the Hirst court was Turner v.
Commissioner. The Turner donor made gifts of stock to three of her
interest in the other two tracts to two grandchildren outright and to her son as trustee for her third
minor grandchild.
12. Id At the time taxpayer decided to transfer her interests in the land, she owned the house
in which she lived, a one-half interest in a house being used as an office building, and had $25,000
on deposit in savings accounts. Id
13. Id That only two of the five donees agreed to and did pay all the gift taxes in question
was not addressed by the court.
14. Id For a discussion of the net gift computation, see note 2 supra.
15. 572 F.2d at 435. A total $85,469.55 in gift tax was paid of which $68,277.00 was federal
gift tax and $17,192.55 was state gift tax.
16. Id at 435-36. The Commissioner made the following calculations:
Total gift tax paid $85,469.55
Less adjusted basis of property 8,377.00
Realized gain 77,092.55
Recognized gain-50% (capital treatment) 38,546.28
17. 63 T.C. 307, 310 (1974), a.F'dper cur/am en banc, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
18. 572 F.2d at 428.
19. Id at 431.
20. Id at 428. Senior Circuit Judge Bryan's opinion dissenting from the decision of the
panel, later made part of the majority en banc opinion, was based in part on the inviolability of
the Tax Court's findings of fact and law. Id at 432-33. This Note does not address this issue. For
a discussion of this issue, see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333-34 (1945);
Commissioner v. Scottish Am. Inv. Co., 323 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1944); Dobson v. Commissioner,
320 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1943).
21. 572 F.2d at 437-39 (Winter and Butzner, JJ., dissenting).
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children outright and six gifts in trust22 for the benefit of her grandchil-
dren. Each transfer was conditioned on the recipient paying the gift
,tax. The gift taxes were paid by the individuals out of available cash
and sales of some of the stock, and by the trusts from sales of part of
the stock, loans, and small amounts of current trust income. The Com-
missioner alleged that the transfers were part sale, part gift.23 The Tax
Court rejected the part sale analysis24 and held that the transfers were
net gifts that produced no taxable gain for the donor.2" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affimed per curiam.
26
The Turner decision was questioned by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. Commissioner (the decision that the
22. The Turner, Johnson, and Hirst decisions are related to a line of cases dealing with gift
tax agreements in the context of gifts in trust. Realization of taxable income has generally been
found when trust income is used to pay gift taxes because the donor is considered to have retained
an income interest in the trust that is taxable to him under I.R.C. §§ 671, 677 (sections attributing
trust income to grantor as substantial owner of portion of trust).
In Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aj7'd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 786 (1943), the decedent donor transferred stock in trust in return for the trustee's prom-
ise to pay him cash from the trust income, which the donor used to pay the gift taxes. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this was income reserved by the donor and
taxable to him as ordinary income. The Staley decision was relied on in a series of cases in which
trustees paid the gift tax out of the trust income. In Sheaffer's Estate v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 99
(1961), af'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963), the trustee was given
discretion to use the trust income to pay the donor's gift tax liability. The gift tax was paid in part
from the current income of the trusts and in part from borrowed funds. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that income was reserved for the benefit of the donor and
was taxable to him under I.R.C. §§ 671, 677. In Commissioner v. Morgan's Estate, 37 T.C. 981
(1962), aft'd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963), the trustees were given
discretion to sell trust corpus or borrow funds using the corpus as security to obtain funds to pay
the gift tax. The trustees used borrowed funds to pay the gift tax and then repaid the loans from
trust income in subsequent years. The Tax Court held that I.R.C. § 677 did not apply because the
gift taxes had been paid and the repayment of the loan did not confer any benefit on the donor. In
light of Morgan there was an entirely new proceeding in Sheaffer. The Tax Court in Estate of
Sheaffer, 35 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 66,126 (1966), held in line with Morgan that the repayment of a loan
out of trust income did not give rise to taxable income. The court also held, however, that the use
of current trust income to pay a later year's tax deficiency was taxable to the donor in accord with
the first Sheaffer decision.
23. At trial and again on appeal, the Commissioner conceded that the transfers in trust were
not sales. 410 F.2d at 753.
24. The Tax Court also rejected the part sale, part gift argument in Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C.
1242 (1972), in which the court held that because the donor had no further interest in the trust to
which the gift was made, and because the transfer was a net gift, not a part sale, which under
Turner was not an income producing transfer, the donor realized no taxable gain when the trustee
paid the gift taxes out of the proceeds of a loan secured by the trust. The Turner rationale was
relied on once again in Davis v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 71,318 (1971), aft'dper curlam,
469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the Tax Court held that the donor realized no taxable gain
when the trustee paid the gift taxes out of cash on hand from a prior year because the donor
retained no interest in the trust and because, as in Turner, the donor intended a net gift and not a
part sale. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam the Tax
Court's disposition of the part sale contention. 469 F.2d 694, 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. 49 T.C. 356, 363 (1968).
26. 410 F.2d at 753.
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Commissioner argued was controlling in Hirst). The donor in Johnson
made a gift in trust for his children of stock that was subject to a secur-
ity interest under a loan agreement entered into by the donor immedi-
ately before making the gift. Under this prior arrangement, the lending
bank received a thirty day note on which the donor had "no personal
liability." The trustees of the trust to which Johnson transferred the
stock, the donor's wife and the bank, replaced the donor's note with
their own secured by the trust corpus. The donor used most of the loan
proceeds to pay the gift tax. The Tax Court held the transfer to be a
part sale resulting in taxable gain to the donor, distinguishing Turner
on the ground that the Johnson gift was not conditioned on payment of
the gift taxes by the trustees.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court
result but rejected its reasoning, relying instead on three different bases
for finding against the taxpayer. The first basis for the Johnson holding
was that the gift of $150,000 worth of stock was an exchange for
$200,000 in cash, which was income regardless of how the donor used
the money. The second was that the donee, by paying the gift taxes,
discharged the donor's legal obligation, resulting in the donor's con-
structive receipt of income under the doctrine of Old Colony Trust v.
Commissioner.28 In that case, payment of income taxes by an employer
in consideration for services rendered by an employee was held by the
United States Supreme Court to be taxable income to the employee.
The third basis, and the one most heavily relied on by the court, was
the finding that the donor "shed" his debt to the trust and realized in-
come in that amount, based on the court's extension of the rule in
Crane v. Commissioner.29 In that case the amount of a mortgage on the
seller's house for which neither the seller nor buyer had any primary
personal liability was held by the United States Supreme Court to be
part of the seller's amount realized on sale of the house.
The court was clearly correct in finding that Turner and Hirst were
27. 59 T.C. 791, 812-13 (1973). The Tax Court distinguished Turner further by finding no
reservation of an interest in the trust, and on the ground that the loans were not the same thing as
a donor's gift tax liability. Id
28. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
29. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The court in Johnson extended the narrow Crane holding that "shed-
ding" encumbrances constitutes an element of gain in sales of real property, to apply to the situa-
tion in which encumbered property is the subject of a gift, the amount of the encumbrance there
being treated as a part sale. 495 F.2d at 1083-84. This reasoning may extend to net gift situations
in which the gift property is "encumbered" by the obligation to pay the gift taxes, which is as-
sumed by the donee by pregift agreement. The scope of application of this "shedding of liability"
principle is still very much in debate. See Note, Income Tax Consequences ofEncumbered Gifts:
Thedvent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 935 (1976).
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factually almost indistinguishable" and that each involved proper use
of the net gift form of transfer.3 1 The court was also correct in finding
that Turner was not overruled by Johnson, but only limited to its
facts.32 But the reasoning of the Hirst court is weak in several respects
due to the acceptance of Turner as valid precedent and to the refusal to
consider the arguments raised in Johnson as they apply to a net gift
form of transfer.
First, in accord with Turner,33 the court found that the donor only
intended to make a net gift and not a part sale, part gift, as contended
by the Commissioner. The gift tax label for the transaction does not,
however, automatically determine its income tax consequences.34 The
donor's intent pertaining to all portions of the transfer must be ana-
lyzed to see if this type of gift transfer creates any basis for finding
taxable income. 'he donative intent behind a net gift differs from that
accompanying an unconditional gift. In the former case the donor's
donative intent is limited to the net portion of the gift, while in the
latter the donative intent goes to the whole gift property. It is not
clear what the donor's intent is with respect to the part of the property
that is allocated to the gift tax. Restructuring the transfer, it is arguable
that this portion of the gift property remained with the donor who then
exchanged it with the donee for the donee's payment of the gift taxes.
The Hirst court did not examine the possibility that there was such an
exchange.36
Second, the court rejected the argument that the donee's payment
of the gift taxes was a discharge of the donor's legal obligation resulting
in income to the donor.37 This argument was raised in Johnson38 but
not in Turner.39 The court found the discharge of obligations rule to be
30. 572 F.2d at 428, 433.
31. The correctness of the court's finding is supported by Rev. Rul. 75-72, discussed in note 2
supra, which limits the use of this device to cases in which the donee's agreement to pay the gift
taxes is a condition of the gift transfer.
32. 495 F.2d at 1086.
33. The Turner court affirmed the Tax Court in rejecting only the part sale, part gift argu-
ment. 49 T.C. 356, 362-64 (1968).
34. See note 2 supra.
35. See id
36. The Tax Court in Hirst recognized the possibility that there had been an exchange. 63
T.C. 307, 315 (1974).
37. For a discussion of the discharge of obligations doctrine, see note 3 and text accompany-
ing note 28 supra. See also Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940).
38. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
39. 410 F.2d at 753. The Tax Court in Hirst conceded that the reasoning used in Johnson
was a more "realistic" view of the net gift, 63 T.C. 307, 315 (1974), but nevertheless abided by
Turner, as did the court of appeals.
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a flexible one that depends on the relations of the parties and the exist-
ence of other obligations.' The court implied in a hypothetical that
the son's payment of the gift tax was a "gift back" to his mother result-
ing in no taxable income to her.4 The facts do not support this gift
back theory however. The donee was obligated by a promise to the
donor to pay the gift taxes for the donor's benefit in order to receive the
gift of property. Also, the donee paid no gift tax on his payment of the
gift taxes. In essence, the transfer was a payment to the donor in return
for the gift, which was then used to satisfy the gift taxes.42
Third, the court stated that the substance of the net gift transaction
rather than its form should control the donor's tax liability,43 but relied
nevertheless on the net giftform of the transfer to reach its result.44 In
substance, the donor in Hirst was attempting to arrange for payment of
the gift taxes without incurring any taxable gain in the process. This
goal was carried out in Turner and Hirst by use of the net gift transfer.
This same goal was attempted in Johnson by a transfer in which the net
gift device was not used, but in that case the donor had to pay income
tax as a cost of achieving this goal. It is difficult to reconcile these op-
posing tax results given the common underlying substance of the trans-
actions. Had taxpayer in Hirst, as in Johnson, taken out a loan using
the gift property as security before the transfer, used the proceeds to
pay the gift taxes, and then transferred the encumbered property, she
would have realized taxable income. Had she sold a capital asset
before the transfer to raise cash to pay the gift taxes she would have
realized taxable gain. Had she retained a portion of the capital asset
transferred equal in value to the amount of gift taxes due and ex-
changed this with the donee for the payment of the gift taxes, she
would have realized taxable gain from the exchange. But because she
used a net gift form of transfer she could make the same gift and get the
taxes paid at no additional tax cost, even though she thereby seemed to
40. 572 F.2d at 431.
41. Id
42. Cf Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) (taxpayer realized income when, pursuant to
contract, a trust discharged his debt).
43. 572 F.2d at 430; see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Greg-
ory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
44. In form, Hirst received no cash in hand from the transfer nor did she make a sale of her
property in the ordinary sense of the term. But in substance she did not need to receive cash in
hand to realize economic benefit from the transfer. For a discussion of the capital gains tax sav-
ings available with use of the net gift, see note 2 supra. Also, in substance she did not need
technically to make a sale in order to realize income from the transfer. See Helvering v. Bruun,
309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940).
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enjoy economic gain. It appears that the court in Hirst did not ade-
quately analyze the substance of the net gift and compare it with that of
other forms of transfer before deciding on its income tax consequences.
In this respect, the court let the form of the transfer control its result.
In Hirst, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has given
renewed approval to the use of the net gift transfer as a tax saving de-
vice and has reduced the uncertainty surrounding its use after the
Johnson decision. Donors lacking cash can still use this gift technique
and benefit additionally from the capital gains tax savings that arise
from using it. The donee will still only have to pay gift tax on the net
gift, not the full value of the property transferred. Courts will continue
to have to base their tax results on factual distinctions concerning the
form of the transfer. Congress ultimately may have to step in and more
clearly provide for taxation of the donor in these situations or provide
for nonrecognition of gain if policy should so suggest. Until then, how-
ever, courts should consider applying existing doctrines such as Old
Colony Trust and Crane to achieve more consistent income tax results.
The issue in Hirst is a close one that has given a great deal of
conceptual trouble to the courts. Unfortunately, the Hirst court de-
cided to adhere to the factually similar Turner decision, without ade-
quately dealing with the critical analysis made of that case in Johnson.
Thus, the court did not fully consider the conditional nature of the gift,
the limits to the donative intent, the exchange element of part of the
transfer,. the presence of economic gain, and the applicability of non-
sale bases for finding taxable income such as the Old Colony Trust and
Crane doctrines. A closer examination of these factors should produce
a different net gift income tax result than the one reached in Hirst. But
until Congress acts or the United States Supreme Court decides to re-
solve the inconsistencies between Johnson on the one hand, and Turner
and Hirst on the other, the net gift device will continue to have vitality
and tax planning utility in the Fourth Circuit.
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